Case FileIndependent investigation

Defamation / liability for publication / receiver

Are the Receiver and Mizrahi Tefahot Bank Liable for a Publication by Attorney Dotan Tzur ?

Defamation: Liability

Receiver, Mizrahi Tefahot Bank, Dotan Tzur attorney, liability for defamatory publication

Who is liable when the attorney of a receiver calls a person “thief, fraudster and criminal” after an enforcement hearing: the attorney himself, the receiver he represents, the law office where he works, or also the creditor in the case, that is, Mizrahi Tefahot Leasing Ltd and Mizrahi Tefahot Bank? This is how the question is examined under the chapter “Those Liable for Defamatory Publication” in Uri Shenhar’s book, Dinei Lashon Hara (Defamation Law), and a judgment of the Haifa Magistrate’s Court on a bank’s liability for the acts of a receiver.

Chen Fisher Gabbay receiver: the facts in the file

On 13 January 2026 a hearing was held at the Haifa enforcement office in case 515509-06-24, a pledge enforcement case concerning a vehicle under receivership. According to the protocol, the receiver’s counsel was Dotan Tzur, attorney, of the Chen Fisher Gabbay law office, whose members are Victor Fisher, attorney, Ofer Chen, attorney, and Elad Gabbay, attorney. The creditor in the case is Mizrahi Tefahot Leasing Ltd. The protocol states that the creditor did not appear, and at the same time lists Yaniv Perlov as the declarant in the enforcement application and as the creditor’s representative who was examined at the hearing. In his testimony Perlov said that he works for Mizrahi Tefahot Bank and that Mizrahi Tefahot Leasing is a subsidiary.

According to the protocol, Perlov told the defendant that the creditor was willing to settle the debt, grant a discount or an instalment plan. This is the background to the questions about paying a Mizrahi Tefahot debt: the defendant claimed at the hearing that he had asked to repay the Mizrahi Tefahot Leasing loan early and could not find anyone to speak to, and the receiver’s counsel claimed that the loan was originally granted by Igud Leasing Ltd, which changed its name. These are party claims.

What was heard after the hearing

According to a transcript of a recording of the same day, at 13:15, Dotan Tzur, attorney, says to the defendant “thief, fraudster and criminal” and “scum of the human race”. In the transcript the defendant addresses “Yaniv” and asks a woman “Are you from Mizrahi?”, and she answers “I am with him”, the transcript identifying her as an employee of Chen Fisher. Attorney Tzur says: “Don’t talk to him, he will start telling things there”. These documents indicate that some of the words may have been spoken in the presence of a representative of the creditor, but the transcript does not state who exactly was present, so this is a question of evidence.

What the book says about those liable for publication

According to the chapter (Shenhar, pp. 159 to 161), civil liability for defamatory publication is determined under the law of torts. The publisher is liable first of all. In addition, a principal, an employer, a person who authorised or approved the publication, and a corporation of which the publisher is an organ may bear liability. The liability is joint and several, and imposing it on another does not release the publisher.

According to the book, imposing liability on someone other than the publisher requires, among other things, a contribution to the wrong and not to a lawful act, and awareness of this. Some hold that intent is also required. The book notes that applying these rules to defamation raises difficulty.

First question: is the receiver liable

In the judgment reviewed below it was held that a receiver is an officer of the court and not the agent of the creditor. According to the protocol, Attorney Tzur is the receiver’s counsel. According to the documents available to us there is no evidence that the receiver authorised the words spoken after the hearing, approved them or knew of them. On the other hand, the same judgment ordered the receiver himself to pay compensation for negligence in the eviction process, that is, a receiver bears personal liability for his acts. Whether the receiver is liable for a publication would be a question of evidence about the relationship between him and his counsel.

Second question: Mizrahi Tefahot Bank and Mizrahi Tefahot Leasing Ltd

On 6 January 2026, a week before the hearing, the defendant sent an e-mail to Yaniv Perlov. According to the readable parts of the printout, he wrote that he had asked to repay the loan early, that he had not found anyone to speak to, and that he had no interest in acting against Mizrahi. No reply was attached. According to the defendant’s claim, the letter shows that a representative of the bank knew of the dispute before the hearing. It does not show knowledge of words spoken a week later. Whoever seeks to hold the creditor liable will have to prove the conditions the book mentions: a contribution, awareness, and authorisation or an agency relationship.

Conflict of interests: the Haifa judgment

In Civil Case 20783-11-15 (Haifa Magistrate’s Court, 24.6.2020) a tenant claimed compensation for an unlawful eviction from an apartment under mortgage, from Bank Jerusalem Ltd and from the receiver appointed to realise it. This is a different bank, and the case concerns an eviction, not defamation.

The bank argued that it is not an executive arm of the enforcement authority, that the receiver is an officer of the court and not its agent, and that it did not know the plaintiff lived there. The claim against the bank was dismissed. The court held that knowledge was not proved and that the bank could not be expected to cross-check documents in different files. It added that the receiver “is not the agent of the debtor or of the creditor but an officer of the court”, relying on Civil Appeal 8410/06 Nakash v. Bank Leumi Mortgages. The receiver himself was ordered to pay NIS 40,000 compensation, NIS 2,000 expenses and NIS 15,000 attorney’s fees.

The argument against the creditor’s liability is therefore that the receiver is independent. The opposing argument is that this file does not concern a breach of a duty to a third party but words spoken by counsel, perhaps in the presence of the creditor’s representative, after the latter had received written notice. The judgment itself rested on lack of knowledge. Had knowledge been proved, the discussion might have differed, but that is speculation and not a finding.

What this article does not decide

This article does not determine that anyone is liable. The Haifa judgment was given by a court of first instance, does not deal with defamation, and we have no information on whether an appeal was filed. The article does not examine whether the words are “defamation” or what defences are available to the defendants. The book’s content is presented in independent wording.

Sources